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THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION ACT
DAVID L. WALTHER*
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act was approved and
recommended by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws on August 1, 1968. If enacted in Wisconsin, the
Uniform Act would profoundly change the basis for the exercise of
child custody jurisdiction.
WISCONSIN CASE LAW
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized three bases for juris-
diction over the custody of children. In Greef v. Greef' and Zillmer v.
Zillmer2 the Supreme Court relied upon a tentative draft of the Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws,3 which provided as bases for jurisdiction the
following:
1. Domicile of the child within the state.
2. Physical presence of the child within the state.
3. Personal jurisdiction over the parties contending for custody.
In Greef v. Greef the Wisconsin Court noted:
... the theory of jurisdiction based on domicile is founded on the
proposition that custody is a question of status, but that the
protection of the child where physically present and the interests
of those (normally the parents) who are disputing among them-
selves for the child's custody are important considerations.4
The Court then continued, quoting from the proposed comments of
the Restatement section:
"On the other hand, no unanimity exists as to which of these
bases should have this exclusive position. In point of fact, each
one provides a reasonable and suitable basis upon which a court
may proceed in a proper case. The state in which the child is
physically present must have power to take the necessary steps
for his protection; that which has personal jurisdiction over those
competing for the custody provides a convenient forum in which
to try the issue; and lastly that of the child's domicile should also
have jurisdiction because it will normally have the greatest
concern with his welfare. .. . As a result there will be situations
where three states have concurrent judicial jurisdiction, namely,
the state of the child's domicile, that where he is physically
*B.S. Marquette University, J.D. Marquette University; Partner, Walther,
Halling and Conmey, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Member, Wisconsin Bar Associa-
tion. The author was assisted by Jeffrey L. Abraham.
1.6. Wis. 2d 269, 94 N.W.2d 625 (1959).
2 8 Wis. 2d 657, 100 N.W.2d 564 (1960).
3 Section 117, Tentative Draft 1, Restatement 2d, Conflict of Laws (1953). This
section was subsequently withdrawn.
4 6 Wis. 2d at 276, 94 N.W. 2d at 629.
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present at the time of suit, and that which has personal
jurisdiction over those (normally the parents) who are compet-
ing for his custody."5
In Brazy v. Brazy a fourth basis of jurisdiction was recognized.
Brazy held that a Wisconsin court had jurisdiction to modify the
custody provisions of a divorce judgment rendered in Wisconsin. The
Court stated:
We are of the opinion that plaintiff's objection that the Wis-
consin court could not act 'because of lack of personal jurisdiction
over her was not well taken. She was plaintiff in the original
action. The divorce judgment made it evident in a number of
provisions that the rights of the parties would be subject to
possible further orders of the court. Sec. 247.25, Stats., pro-
vided for subsequent alterations of the judgment concerning care,
custody, maintenance, and education of the children. Notice to
her of the application for modification need not be delivered to
her within Wisconsin.
7
The Court, however, held that even though a Wisconsin court had
jurisdiction to act, it should have declined to do so, inasmuch as an
action in a California court, covering the same subject matter, was
pending. The Court then stated:
The orderly administration of justice requires that there be some
rule for avoiding the conflicting exercise of jurisdiction by two
courts both of which are competent to decide the issues. Ordin-
arily, a court should not exercise jurisdiction over subject matter
over which another court of competent jurisdiction has com-
menced to exercise it.8
This concept, applied by the Wisconsin court to avoid conflicting
jurisdiction, is incorporated into the Uniform Act along with procedural
devices to insure that such a conflict will not arise.
In Anderson v. Anderson9 the Court reaffirmed that a Wisconsin
court has jurisdiction at any time to modify the provisions of a Wis-
consin divorce judgment relating to the custody of the minor children
of the parties.
Thus, under Wisconsin case law as it existed prior to the most recent
statutory provisions, there were actually four bases upon which child
custody jurisdiction could be predicated: domicile, physical presence,
personal jurisdiction over the parents, and jurisdiction based on modifi-
cation of a prior judgment.
It is thus theoretically possible, under Wisconsin case law, for four
states to have concurrent jurisdiction over the question of a child's
custody, and to render four conflicting custody decrees.
5 Id. at 276-277, 94 N.W.2d at 629.
6 5 Wis. 2d 352, 92 N.W.2d 738 (1958).
7Id. at 361-362, 92 N.W. at 743.
8 Id. at 361, 92 N.W. at 742-743.




There is statutory authority for three of the above bases of jurisdic-
tion. First, where jurisdiction over the parties is obtained, either in
personam, or quasi in rem, a Wisconsin court may determine custody.10
This is so even where the action is for divorce or legal separation, and
relief is denied."
Second, a Wisconsin court may exercise jurisdiction to modify a
Wisconsin custody judgment.
The court may from time to time afterwards, on the petition of
either of the parties and upon notice to the family court commis-
sioner, revise and alter such judgment concerning the care,
custody, maintenance and education of any of the children and
make a new judgment concerning the same as the circumstances
of the parents and the benefi tof the children shall require.?
Third, the physical presence of the child within the State confers
jurisdiction.
... an independent action for custody may be commenced in any
county of this state in which the child is present. The effect of
any determination of a child's custody shall not be binding per-
sonally against a defendent parent or guardian unless the defen-
dant has been made personally subject to the jurisdiction of the
court in the action as provided in § 247.06.'3
There is no statutory authority for jurisdiction based upon the
domicile of the child within the state.
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
Under the Uniform Act jurisdiction based upon personal jurisdic-
tion of the parties, presence of the child within the State or modifica-
tion of a prior judgment is eliminated. Rather, jurisdiction is based on
domicile, or, as phrased in th Act, the "home state" of the child. By
limiting jurisdiction to the domicile of the child the Commission was
attempting to eliminate a growing problem of our mobile society. Fre-
quently, one or both of the parties in a marital dispute leaves the state.
When a decree awards custody, the losing party, unwilling to accept the
judgment of the court, may remove the child or fail to return him after
a visit.
The commission found that this unfortunate state of affairs is facili-
tated rather than discouraged by the law, because the law provides no
certainty as to whether a custody decree rendered in one state is entitled
to recognition and enforcement in another, nor when one state may alter
a custody decree of another state.
10 Wis. STAT. §§ 247.03(e), 247.05(4), 247.24 (1967).
11 WIs. STAT. § 247.28 (1967).
12 WIS. STAT. § 247.25 (1967).
13 Wis. STAT. § 247.05 (4) (1967).
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Since the United States Supreme Court has never settled the
question of whether the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
applies to custody decrees, many states modify custody decrees of sister
states almost at will. 14 The commissioners therefore concluded:
Generally speaking, there has 'been a tendency to over-emphasize
the need for fluidity and modifiability of custody decrees at the
expense of the equal (if not greater) need, from the standpoint
of the child, for stability of custody decisions once made.' 5
As a result of such fluidity the courts of the various states often act
in competition with each other, and a court of one state may award
custody to one parent while another court awards custody simul-
taneously to the other parent. In such a situation litigants may be sub-
ject to contempt of court and criminal charges for taking a child in dis-
obedience to the order of one state although in compliance with the
decree of another.
The commission then made the following observation with regard to
states such as Wisconsin, which provide a jurisdictional basis derived
from the physical presence of the child:
In this confused legal situation the person who has possession
of the child has an enormous tactical advantage. Physical
presence of the child opens the doors of many courts to the
petitioner and oten assures him of a decision in his favor. It is
not surprising then that custody claimants tend to take the law
into their own hands, that they resort to self-help in the form of
child stealing, kidnapping, or various other schemes to gain
possession of the child. The irony is that persons who are good,
law-abiding citizens are often driven into these tactics against
their inclinations; and that lawyers who are reluctant to advise
the use of maneuvers of doubtful legality may place their clients
at a decided disadvantage.'
The commission cited extensive authority which, in recent years, has
called for uniform legislation to bring about interstate stability in
custody awards, and indicated that the commission had drawn heavily
upon the work of these authors in cooperation with the American Bar
Association.'
7
The Act is not reciprocal. It can be enacted by any state regardless
of enactment by other states. Its effectiveness, however, depends upon
the number of states which adopt it.
14People ex rel Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); cf. Comment, Ford
vs. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrees? 73 YALE L. J. 134(1963).
15 Prefatory note to Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, p. 24.
16 Id. at 5.
'v Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MIcH. L. REV. 795 (1964)
Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem: A
reply to Professor Currie and a Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L. REv.
183 (1965) ; Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A




The Act limits custody jurisdiction to the state where the child has
his home, or where there are other strong contacts with the child and
his family. It provides easier recognition and enforcement of out-of-state
custody decrees. jurisdiction to modify decrees of other states is limited
by giving a jurisdictional preference to the prior court under certain
conditions. Access to a court may be denied a petitioner who has
engaged in child snatching or similar practices. The Act opens up direct
lines of communication between courts of different states to prevent
jurisdictional conflict and encourage interstate judicial assistance in
custody cases.
The Act places greater importance on the personal appearance
before the court of non-residents who claim custody, and of the child
himself, and provides for the payment of travel expenses for this pur-
pose. The Act insures that the judge will receive necessary out-of-state
information with the assistance of courts in other states.
The report of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, setting forth the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody
jurisdiction Act, includes after each section extensive commentary as
to the effects of its provisions.
PROVISIONS OF ACT
(1) Purposes of Act
The purposes of the Act are set forth in detail because the Uniform
Law breaks new ground not previously covered by legislation. The
stated purposes are as follows:
1. To avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between courts
of different states, which result in shifting children from state to state.
2. To promote cooperation between the courts of other states, so
that a custody decree will be rendered in whatever state can best
decide the case in the interests of the child.
3. To assure that child custody litigation will take place in the
state where the child and his family have the closest connection and
where the best evidence concerning the child's care, protection, train-
ing, and personal relationships is most readily available.
Courts of the enacting state are to decline jurisdiction when the
child and his family have a closer connection with another state.
4. To discourage continuing child custody controversy, for
greater stability of home environment and family relationships.
5. To deter unilateral removals of children undertaken for
custody purposes.
6. To minimize the relitigation of custody decisions.
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7. To facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees in other
states.
8. To expand the exchange of information between courts of the
various states concerned with the same child.
9. To make the laws of those states which enact the Act uniform.
(2) Definitions
Section 2 of the Act contains the definitions of the significant terms
used in the Act. The most significant departure from existing law is in
the definition of "custody proceeding". The definition has been expanded
to include "proceedings in which a custody determination is one of
several issues, such as an action for divorce or separation, and includes
child neglect and dependency proceedings." I s The comment indicates
that this term also covers habeas corpus actions, guardianship proceed-
ings, and any other proceeding to determine custody. The Act would
lose much effectiveness if its provisions did not encompass all pro-
ceedings in which a custody determination could be made.
(3) Bases of Jurisdiction
Section 3 states the basis upon which a court has jurisdiction either
in the initial proceedings or in an action to modify a decree.
Subsection (a) (1) provides that a court may make such a determi-
nation if it is either the "home state" of the child at the time of the
commencement of the proceedings, or the state has been the child's
"home state" within six months before commencement of the proceed-
ings, and the child is absent from the state but a parent or acting parent
continues to reside in the state. "Home state" is defined by Section 2(5)
as the state in which the child lived with a parent or acting parent for
six consecutive months immediately preceding the action, or in a case
where a child is less than six months old, the state in which he has lived
from 'birth. Periods of temporary absence do not destroy the continuity
of the six-month period.
Subsection (a) (2) provides for jurisdiction where it is in the best
interests of the child that a court assume jurisdiction, because either the
child and his parents or the child and at least one contestant have a
significant connection with the state, and in addition, there is avail-
able in the state substantial evidence concerning the child's care, pro-
tection, training and personal relationships.
Subsection (a) (3) confers jurisdiction where the child is physically
present in the state, but only if the child has been abandoned, or it is
necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he is neglected,
dependent, or subjected to mistreatment or abuse.
Subsection (a) (4) confers jurisdiction where no other state would
have jurisdiction under the prerequisites of the first three sub-para-
18 Section 2, Proposed Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
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graphs, or if another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
grounds that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the
custody of the child, and in addition, if this state decides that it is in the
best interests of the child that a court of the state assume jurisdiction.
Subsections 3(b) and (c) provide that except for the exceptional
circumstances set forth in the previous paragraphs, physical presence
of the child in the state is not, in itself, sufficient to confer jurisdiction,
and that physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a pre-
requisite for jurisdiction. The comment to this section states:
In the first place, a court in the child's home state has jurisdic-
tion, and secondly, if there is no home state or the child and his
family have equal or stronger ties with another state, a court in
that state has jurisdiction. If this alternative test produces con-
current jurisdiction in more than one state, the mechanisms pro-
vided in sections 6 and 7 are used to assure that only one state
makes the custody decision. 9
Extension of the home rule for a six-month period after the child's
departure is to protect a parent who has been left by his spouse. This
constitutes a substantial departure from existing laws which require
either physical presence of the child, or personal jurisdiction over the
departing parent as a condition for the exercise of the jurisdiction, thus
forcing the person left behind to follow the departed person to another
state.
Under circumstances where the "home state" test cannot be met, or
if Section 3(2) comes into play as an alternative to that test, jurisdic-
tion may exist in two states simultaneously. However, in these instances,
jurisdiction may not be exercised in both states under Sections 6 and 7
of the Act.
In response to anticipated criticism that Section 3(a) (2) appears
to be very broad, the comment notes:
The paragraph was phrased in general terms in order to be
flexible enough to cover many fact situations too diverse to lend
themselves to exact description. But its purpose is to limit juris-
diction rather than to proliferate it. The first clause of the para-
graph is important: jurisdiction exists only if it is in the child's
interest, not merely the interest or convenience of the feuding
parties, to determine custody in a particular state. The interest
of the child is served when the forum has optimum access to
relevant evidence about the child and family. There must be
maximum rather than minimum contact with the state. The
submission of the parties to a forum, perhaps for purposes of
divorce, is not sufficient without additional factors establishing
closer ties with the state. Divorce jurisdiction does not neces-
sarily include custody jurisdiction.20




The comment further explains that physical presence has been re-
tained as a jurisdictional fact only under exceptional circumstances, to
reaffirm parens patriae jurisdiction, where a child is in need of imme-
diate protection.
The comment also notes that although the section by its terms
governs the jurisdiction to make an initial decree, as well as a modifi-
cation decree, modification jurisdiction is subject to additional restric-
tions contained in Sections 8(b) and 14(a).
(4) Notice
Sections 4 and 5 set forth the notice requirements of the Act. These
requirements are generally consistent with present methods of provid-
ing hearing notice.
(5) Proceedings in Other States
Sections 6 and 7 deal with the problem of simultaneous and com-
petitive jurisdictions and provides an alternative to such conflicts by
encouraging judicial restraint.
Section 6 provides that a court may not exercise its jurisdiction if
at the time a petition is filed, a proceeding concerning the custody of
the child is pending in a court of another state, unless such proceeding
is stayed by that court because the other state is a more appropriate
forum. This imposes a burden on courts to investigate the circum-
stances with respect to custody proceedings pending in other states, and
determine which court is the most appropriate. Section 7 provides that
as a general rule this principle of priority will determine which court
will proceed with the action unless that court finds it is not a convenient
forum.
The concept of inconvenient forum is well recognized in Wisconsin
law and in fact the comment to section 7 notes that a portion of this
section of the Act is derived from section 262.19(1) of the Wisconsin
Statutes.
The concept of inconvenient forum is tailored in this section to the
special needs of child custody cases. The criteria set forth in the statute
relate less to the convenience of parties than to the fact that the child is
the central figure.
These criteria include factors relating to which state is the child's
most recent home, which state has the closest connection with the child,
where the evidence is most readily available, and what agreement be-
tween the parties, if any, had been made.
If the court declines to exercise its jurisdiction it may either dismiss
the case or stay the proceedings upon condition that proceedings be
commenced in another jurisdiction. If the court finds it is clearly an
inappropriate forum, it may require the party who commenced the pro-
[Vol. 54
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ceedings to pay necessary travel and other expenses, including attorneys
fees, incurred by the other parties or the witnesses. This provision is
taken from section 262.20 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
(6) Clean Hands Doctrine
Section 8 provides that a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction
where the petitioner has wrongfully taken a child from another state,
has improperly removed the child from the physical custody of the
person entitled to custody, has improperly retained the child after a visit
or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody, or has violated
any other provision of a custody decree of another state.
Further, a wrongful taking does not require a violation of a legal
right. Even where no custody decree has been entered, if a child is
abducted by a parent under circumstances which the court finds objec-
tionable, the court in the exercise of its inherent equity powers need not
permit that party access to its jurisdiction. The application of the "clean
hands doctrine" as a punishment of the parent should not be at the
expense of the well being of the child.
The comment also notes that it would constitute a violation of this
section for a parent who has been given the right of custody, to remove
a child from the state, thereby frustrating the other parent's exercise of
visitation rights.
(7) Information Required by the Court
Sections 9 and 10 provide that the initial pleading in a custody
action must advise the court of the child's present address, where he
has lived for the past five years, and the names and present addresses
of all persons with whom the child has lived during this period. Other
information regarding the history of the child and other custody actions
must also be provided. Based upon this information the court may
require others to be made parties to the action.
(8) Appearance of Parties and Child
Under Section 11 of the Act the court may order any party to the
proceedings who is in the state to appear personally before the court.
If that party has custody of the child, the court may order the child to
appear personally. If a party to the proceedings, however, is outside the
state, with or without the child, the court may direct the party to appear
personally upon penalty of an adverse decision. The section also pro-
vides that if it is just and proper the court may order the other party
to pay travel expenses.
(9) Binding Effect of Decree
Section 12 provides that a decree rendered by a court with jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Section 3 binds all parties who have either been served
within the state, or notified in accordance with the notice provision, and
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thus been given an opportunity to be heard. As to those parties, the
custody decree is conclusive until modified pursuant to law.
There is no need for technical, personal jurisdiction required under
the traditional theory that custody determinations are proceedings in
rein which affect status. This section, however, can have no extra-terri-
torial effect. In May v. Anderson21 the United States Supreme Court
held that full faith and credit need not be given a custody decree where
the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the party against whom
the decision was rendered. The May decision does not affect the internal
validity of such a decree, but relates only to interstate recognition. The
decision permits a recognition of a decree rendered with personal juris-
diction where due process requirements of notice were met, but does not
require such recognition. Section 13, however, makes recognition and
enforcement mandatory if the state in which the prior decree was
rendered has adopted the act, or has statutory jurisdictional require-
ments similar to those of the act, or would have had jurisdiction under
the facts of the case if the Uniform Act had been law in that state.
(10) Modification and Enforcement of Foreign Decrees
Section 14 provides that a court shall not modify a foreign
decree unless it appears that the court which rendered the decree no
longer has jurisdiction under prerequisites in accordance with the
Uniform Act, or has declined to assume jurisdiction. The section further
provides that in modifying a foreign decree, "new consideration" must
be given to the transcript of the record and other documents of all
previous proceedings. Modification jurisdiction turns upon the juris-
dictional requirements of Section 3. Thus, adoption of the Uniform Act
would change present Wisconsin law, which allows modification of any
judgment entered in this state.22
The comment also indicates that the prior court would have juris-
diction to modify its judgment even if its original assumption of juris-
diction did not meet the standards of the Uniform Act, as long as it
would have jurisdiction at the time of the petition for modification
under the standards of the Act.
Section 15 provides that a foreign judgment will be enforced upon
being filed with the clerk of the court. The clerk must treat the foreign
decree in the same manner as a domestic decree. This provision in effect
incorporates the simplified and speedy method of enforcement provided
in the uniform enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act which has been
adopted in Wisconsin as section 270.96 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
There is no Wisconsin statutory provision for the enforcement of a
foreign custody decree at this time. However, the Act would be con-
21 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
22 WIS. STAT. § 247.25 (1967).
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sistent with existing methods of enforcing foreign judgments in non-
custody cases. The comment to the section makes clear that the
authority to enforce an out-of-state decree does not include the power
to modify the decree. If modification is desired, the provisions of Section
14 must be complied with. The comment also makes clear that visita-
tion rights may be enforced under this section.
Section 16 of the Act provides for a registery of foreign decrees,
and Section 17 provides for the furnishing of certified copies of custody
decrees.
(11) Hearings in Other States
Sections 18 through 22 of the Act relate to taking testimony or
holding hearings in other states for use by the court in the forum state.
Under Section 18, depositions may be taken in other states. Under
Section 19, a court may request the court of a foreign state to hold a
hearing and require the attendance of witnesses. The comment indicates
that these section would cover any kind of evidentiary procedure avail-
able under the law of the assisting state including custody investigations.
Section 20 provides that the state give assistance to the court of
another state.
Section 21 relates to the preservation of records until the child
reaches a specified minimum age, and Section 22 provides that a court
must request records of another state upon taking jurisdiction of a case.
(12) International Scope
Section 23 provides that the general policies of the Act extend inter-
nationally and apply to decrees of foreign nations if reasonable notice
and opportunity to be heard were given to all interested persons. The
comment to this section indicates that the need to avoid jurisdictional
conflicts and multiple litigation is just as strong when children are
moved between countries as when they are moved between states.
SUMMARY AND CoNcLuSION
The Uniform Child Jurisdiction Act would change fundamentally
the Wisconsin approach to jurisdiction in child custody cases. jurisdic-
tion would generally be predicated upon the residence of the child.
Simultaneous or successive proceedings in different jurisdictions would
be limited. Kidnapping would be discouraged. Modifications of custody
decrees would be limited, and eliminated in all jurisdictions other than
those which would have a jurisdictional basis for an initial procedure.
New lines of communication would be opened between courts of various
states.
The Act is well summarized in the prefatory statement of the
commissioners:
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"Underlying the entire Act is the idea that to avoid the juris-
dictional conflicts and confusions which have done serious harm
to innumerable children, a court in one state must assume major
responsibility to determine who is to have custody of a particular
child; that this court must reach out for the help of courts in
other states in order to arrive at a fully informed judgment
which transcends state lines and considers all claimants, residents
and nonresidents, on an equal basis and from the standpoint of
the welfare of the child. If this can be achieved, it will be less
important which court exercises jurisdiction but that courts of
the several states involved act in partnership to bring about the
best possible solution for a child's future. '24
The economics of a child custody fight are such that the Uniform
Act would not affect a significant portion of the custody matters. Most
parties concerned with the custody of children simply cannot afford
custody litigation, particularly when this litigation is carried on across
state lines.
Even though the number of children affected by the Act would be
small, nonetheless the legisation does meet a need. The Wisconsin law
which places emphasis upon personal jurisdiction over the parents, or
the physical presence of the child, is obviously less oriented to the best
interests of the child than is the Uniform Act, which predicates juris-
diction upon the home state of the child.
It is certainly inconsistent with any rudimentary concept of justice
for the law to be an accomplice in creating the problems which the
present system of child custody jurisdiction has been breeding. The
Uniform Act is a needed progressive step forward in the improvement
of the administration of justice.
23 Report of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, p. 6.
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